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THE IRRELEVANT CONDITION AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS IN ACTION
WILLIAM M. WHERRY

I. INTRODUCTION
of the most fascinating chapters in the field of administrative law is that in which the use of the device of an irrelevant condition nullified and destroyed a constitutional right established by
the highest court of the State of New York buttressed by well
reasoned opinions in decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
numerous cases.
The difference between the administrative process and the judicial process in action has been frequently commented upon, most
forcibly by Dean Roscoe Pound and the late Justice Robert H. Jackson, who point out that the administrative process seeks "to promote particular ends" in "disregard of legal principles" and seeks to
achieve political rather than just decisions. In short, expediency
rather than principle too often dictates the decisions and orders of administrative bodies.
In the illustration which will be discussed in this paper, not only
were decisions of the highest courts nullified but the legislature of New
York was defied. Repeatedly the Public Service Commission of New
York attempted to get the law amended to conform to its views. Just
as often were they denied. Nevertheless, they imposed their views
upon the public utility companies who came before them for authority
to finance or exercise some other power incidental to carrying out
their franchise obligations.
ONE

II. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
THE technique of the device is to attach an objectionable condition to a privilege, the advantages of which outweigh the objections
and so to conceal the extortionary character of the bargain as to make
it acceptable. Of course, this has been a favorite technique in politics, the most familiar example being a rider proposed as an addition to a bill dealing with a subject entirely different from the matter
itself, usually an appropriation bill. A recent example of this was
found in the riders proposed by Representative Powell of New York
WnmuA.
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for a highly laudable purpose. Representative Powell attached by
amendment to the bill creating a national military reserve, a rider to
accelerate anti-segregation. It is worth quoting what the President
said in regard to this:
"I believe that it is erroneous to try to get legislation of this
character through by tacking it on to something that is so vital to
the security of the United States. I do not believe that the bill creating a reserve is the place for any kind of extraneous legislation. I
don't care what it is." 1
That is a very clear statement of the principle which has been
recognized by the courts from the earliest times. This device of politicians is effectively used by administrative bodies, but its use is by
no means confined to them. Labor leaders and even parents use it.
Many illustrations could be supplied, but a few examples will
suffice to bring out the point as to why such conditions are objectionable. The most familiar example of an irrelevant condition is
found in the nursery rhyme where it was not only irrelevant but
repugnant.
"Mother may I go out to swim?"
"Oh, yes, my darling daughter
But hang your clothes on a hickory limb
-and don't go near the water."
Obviously if the child is to take advantage of the permission
she can not comply with the prohibition. She will either have to
forego her swim or ignore the condition. This may seem a frivolous
illustration but over and over again we find in the cases a similar
dilemma presented.
Sometimes the device is used in contracts, and the courts themselves do some legislating by refusing to enforce them. A good example of this is found in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in connection with salvage operations. A usual provision in contracts covering such operations is a clause which releases
the company furnishing tug boats from all liability for damages due
to accidents. These clauses have given rise to much litigation
especially where accidents are caused by gross negligence or deliberate design. In Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corporation,' and in Boston Metals Co. v. The Winding Gulf,3 such conditions were held to
1 Editorial Page, N. Y. Times, June 10, 1955.
2 349 U. S. 85, 75 S. Ct. 629, 99 L. Ed. 523 (1955).
3 349 U. S. 122, 75 S. Ct. 649, 99 L. Ed. 543 (1955).
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be void because they were against public policy. Of course, the conditions were relevant to the object of the contract, but it was shocking to the judges that anyone could escape liability for a tortious
act by contract. Therefore, the court held the condition void. The
courts have dealt with objectionable conditions and nullified them,
not only when they were irrelevant but when they were unjust, extortionate, against public policy or unconstitutional.
An ancient conception of equity and justice was also involved
in the salvage cases. From early days, extortionate charges were
resisted and legislated against because of the inequality in the bargaining position of the parties. The traveler arriving late, on a stormy
night, at the only inn, was in no position to bargain with the landlord. He was even worse off than the "Chieftain to the Highlands
Bound", for his pence was more precious to him than the latter's
pound. In later years laborers, consumers, shippers in non-competitive markets invoked the same principle, sometimes without justification but always with emotional eloquence.
In dealing with these conditions, the courts have been guided
by their conception of what justice required. The principles thus developed and the method of developing them is illustrated in two
important cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, which are
examples of many other similar cases. That principle has also been
beautifully expounded in several cases in the Court of Appeals of
New York.
4
In United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad,
the Interstate Commerce Commission issued a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing issuance of securities by a railroad company with the proviso that the applicant should impound in
a separate fund money which was not to be paid out unless authorized
by order of the court or the Interstate Commerce Commission. Suit
was brought to have this proviso declared void and to enjoin its enforcement. The decision of the Supreme Court held the condition
beyond the statutory and constitutional power of the Commission to
impose. Judge Sutherland wrote the opinion. He said in part:
•.. "A condition contained in the order by which the grant is limited
is as much a part of the order as any of its substantive provisions,
and, if beyond the jurisdiction of the commission, is not ratified by
an acceptance of the valid part of the order. It long has been settled
4 282 U. S. 311, 51 S. Ct. 159, 75 L. Ed. 359 (1930).
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in this court that the rejection of an unconstitutional condition imposed by a state upon the grant of a privilege, even though the state
possesses the unqualified power to withhold the grant altogether, does
not annul the grant. The grantee may ignore or enjoin the enforcement of the condition without thereby losing the grant.... The order
in itself, being complete and self-sustaining and resting upon grounds
found to be sufficient to support it, cannot be made to depend upon
submission to a collateral condition, which, as we have shown, is beyond the statutory constitutional power of the commission to impose.
Whatever may be the general rule, we have no difficulty in concluding that, under the circumstances above recited, the principle in respect of the separability of unconstitutional conditions imposed upon
a privilege granted by a state is applicable to the present order of the
commission-and for a stronger reason, since that body, unlike a state
in the class of cases referred to, does not possess the power arbitrarily
to deny the authority here sought by the carrier." 5
The other case to which I wish to call attention is an earlier decision where the opinion was written by Justice Brandeis. In Buck
v. Kuyckendall,6 a proviso was attached to a certificate of public
convenience and necessity issued by an administrative bureau. The
condition was condemned as being inconsistent with the granting of
the certificate and of "such a character as to defeat the purpose of
Congress", as expressed in the legislation providing for Federal aid
to states for the construction of interstate highways. Justice Brandeis stated: "The vice of the legislation is dramatically exposed by
the fact that the State of Oregon issued this certificate which is equivalent to a legislative declaration that despite existing facilities public
convenience and necessity require the establishment by Buck of the
auto stage line between Seattle and Portland." From this it followed
that the provision had the effect "not merely to burden" interstate
7
commerce "but to obstruct it."1
From the above illustrations, the technique is clear and also the
attitude of courts towards conditions which are objectionable and
unenforceable.
There are other elements essential to the technique.
The first deals with the relevancy of the condition and the high
motives of those imposing it. It is often difficult to determine the
relevancy of the condition or the fact whether it will or will not hinder the carrying out of the main purpose of the legislation or the
r, Id. at 328, 331, 51 S. Ct. at 176, 179, 75 L. Ed. at 376, 379.
6 267 U. S. 307, 45 S. Ct. 324, 69 L. Ed. 623 (1925).
7 Id. at 316, 45 S. Ct. at 333, 69 L. Ed. at 632.
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order to which it is attached. Sometimes what seems irrelevant at
one time may appear quite relevant at another time. Besides, very
often, the high purpose of those who propose the condition conceals
its irrelevancy. A good illustration is found in the speeches which
preceded our Civil War. Although the abolition of slavery was dear
to the heart of Lincoln and recognized as an essential step in the
progress towards freedom which was initiated by the American revolution; nevertheless, in debates and addresses to Congress, Lincoln
recognized that the achievement of this freedom must be subordinated
to the main purpose of preserving the Union. If the Union was dissolved the progress toward freedom would certainly have been obstructed and delayed, and perhaps, fatally so. It was only late in
the War that he felt that he could demonstrate that the abolition
of slavery was essential to the preservation of the Union.
A parallel case is presented by the War of 1812, and here we
find the most essential ingredient for resistance to the device-viz.
a resolute fighting spirit and refusal to appease. That War was urged
by the War Hawks, whose main purpose was to secure peace on the
border to stop Indian raids and the action of the British in inciting
those raids. For this purpose they were willing to go to war. It was
not until Henry Clay came East that he found that even more essential to the growth of the republic was freedom of trade and that the
action of the British in impressing our seamen and in obstructing
sea trade, constituted a greater threat to the new republic and its
freedom than even the Indian raids. In his great speech on June 7,
1812, Clay, who never before had advocated resistance to these acts,
made a stirring speech which practically laid the foundation for the
declaration of war, because it enlisted the East in the cause which
the West was already engaged in. In that speech, Henry Clay eloquently urged the defense of our rights at sea and asserted "that the
career of encroachment is never arrested by submission", and therefore the only alternative, to the increasing curtailing of our liberties
by the British, was war.
Primarily, he wanted to check the flow of arms and liquor to
the Indians but he was willing to assert our rights at sea so long as
in the end that would mean safety on the frontier. What seemed
irrelevant when he left for the East was found to be essential to
his main objective when he made the speech of June 7, 1812.8
8 TUCKER, POLTROONS AND PATRIOTS 55

(1954).
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There are, of course, many conditions attached to grants of privilege or other legislation which are relevant and which meet the test
of forwarding the main objective. Nevertheless, there are too many
conditions which are obviously "vicious" to use Justice Brandeis'
word. The vice inherent in them is the illusory nature of the alternative they present. The freedom of contract or choice is quite illusory
in most cases. For that reason, these riders to appropriations and
other bills have been defined as little short of extortion or blackmail.
Certainly, in many instances the device is first cousin to the method
of the highway man. Yet, as is shown by the action of Representative Powell and of Henry Clay, the motives of those using this method may be of the highest character and their sincerity unimpeachable.
Unless we keep this in mind, it will be difficult to understand
why the Public Service Commission of New York was so successful
in defeating the decisions of the highest court of the State in the
cases which we are now about to review.
In the speech of Henry Clay above quoted from, we find a
warning against the essential ingredient in the technique of forcing
acceptance of a repugnant or irrelevant condition. Clay denounced
appeasement, which always results in the increase of regulation, regimentation and the loss of liberty. It is this failure to resist which
has resulted in the acceptance of the illegal conditions and in the
nullification of constitutional rights established by the high courts,
both state and Federal.
In those days, "appeasement" was not popular and duels were
fought by Kentuckians and others at the drop of a hat.
Those are the elements in the technique of using the device of
the irrelevant condition that present the most difficult aspects of our
study.
Undoubtedly, members of administrative boards sincerely felt
that they were fighting the Good Fight, and, therefore, did so with
dogged persistence, great ingenuity and fanatical zeal-not only to
"promote the particular end", they were established to achieve, but
also to compel adoption of a mechanical formula which was only one
of the means to that end.
More difficult to understand is why the managers of the utility
companies, their boards of directors and their stockholders were
willing to appease rather than to fight. They felt compelled to accept
the alternative forced upon them when they applied to the Commis-
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sion for authority to take steps which they considered essential to
the rendering of the service for which their companies were chartered.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
IN New York the courts had many occasions in which they had
to deal with objectionable conditions similar to those involved in the
Federal cases above referred to. However, it was not until administrative boards were established to regulate railroads and public
utilities that the contrast between the judicial approach and the administrative approach commented upon by Dean Pound and Justice
Jackson became most apparent with consequences which both of those
observers, among others, have deplored.
These new modern tribunals, equipped with staffs of legal, accounting and secrdtarial assistants, empowered to make rules of procedure, evidence and social conduct in specialized fields, were designed to perform legislative, judicial and administrative functions
in "adjusting relations and conduct of individuals to meet social
needs," and were naturally apt to consider themselves superior to
other law makers. They were certainly better equipped to do so within definite limitations than most legislatures and courts.
They were not trained to seek justice but to reconcile and correct social maladjustments.
These cases were part of the struggle of the managers of utilities
against the efforts of the public utility commissioners to force lower
rates for the benefit of domestic customers at the expense of investors, especially the holders of equity securities.
The New York legislature in statutes defining the powers and
duties of the State railroad commission attempted by statutory provision to limit and define the kind of conditions which that administrative board could attach to approvals it might be called upon to
give in regard to issuance of securities, transfer of franchises and
the exercise of similar powers. The Public Service law regulating
public utilities was enacted in 1907 and contained provisions taken
from these earlier laws. Section 69 dealt with the issuance of securities; Section 70 with the transfer of franchises. In both of these sections, the legislature defined the findings which the Commission would
have to make in order to give its approval and provided that if it
made these findings then it must ipso facto give its approval. In other
words, the attempt was made by the legislature to limit the power
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of the Commission to attach conditions. Section 69 related to electric and gas companies; Section 55, to the issuance of railroad securities. They were similar in their character.
At the time of the passage of the Public Utility law in 1907,
Frank W. Stevens, the first chairman of the Public Service Commission of New York, appointed by the Governor, opposed this limitation on the power of the Commission and stated that the "Commission
believes that such a limitation will effectually destroy its usefulness
in regulating capitalization". In spite of his opposition, the legislation
was enacted.
In 1911, the first case directly concerning the invalidity of an
irrelevant condition under this section came before the Court of Appeals. In Delaware & Hudson Company v. Stevens,9 Judge Haight,
writing for the Court of Appeals, disapproved of an effort on the
part of Mr. Stevens to evade the statute. In that case, Mr. Stevens
actually submitted a statement in addition to the brief of counsel, in
which he repeated the argument he made when the legislation was
pending. This case was commented on in the opinion in the later
case of Binghamton Light, Heat & Power Company v. Stevens, 0
which arose in 1911. The opinion was written by Judge Chase. The
Binghamton Light, Heat & Power Company applied to the Commission for leave to issue bonds for certain purposes and a hearing was
held under Section 69. The Commission made its approval of the
issuance of the securities conditioned on the company's reducing its
capital stock and adjusting its book accounts by writing off part of
the book value of the plant, real estate, franchise and other rights.
This condition was held by the court to be utterly void and of no
effect. The court quoted with approval, the opinion below in the
Appellate Division written by Justice Kellogg," where the Justice
said: "It is beyond the power of the Commission to permit the issue
of improper securities on the condition that the company cancel
stock of about half the amount. Read together, the two orders permit the company to issue unauthorized securities to attempt to lessen
the harm to the public which may result therefrom". Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held the Commission had
no power to thus barter away the public interest or, on its own terms,
to permit the issue of securities which the law prohibits.
9 197 N. Y. 1, 90 N. E. 60 (1909).
10 203 N. Y. 7, 90 N. E. 114 (1911).
11 143 App. Div. 789, 801, 128 N. Y. Supp. 440, 452 (3d Dept. 1911).
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In the Iroquois Gas Company case, 2 decided in 1934, Judge
Lehman wrote the opinion dealing with the power of the Commission
to attach conditions to an order concerning transfer of franchises and
plant under Section 70 of the Public Service law. He held there was
no power to annex conditions to its approval and that the power
granted by Subdivision 4 of Section 66, to prescribe uniform methods
of keeping accounts and records did not include the power to attach
such a condition under Section 70, to compel a corporation to write
off from its book values, a loss which it had not sustained. The court
disapproved of the contention that the power to grant consent included the power to withhold it and therefore that the Commission
might impose conditions in granting such consent.
Judge Lehman said: "The Public Service Commission by its
consent to a transfer confers no franchise or authority to operate
a public utility. That is derived from the state and the contract of
purchase. The functions of the Commission, in this respect, are purely regulatory. Its orders are subject to review by the court. It may
withhold its consent to a transfer of a franchise granted by the state,
unless such transfer is shown to be in the public interest. It may
insist upon the insertion in the contract of terms and conditions which
will reasonably protect the public interest, before it grants consent.
It may exercise powers of regulation or direction elsewhere given in
order to assure proper operation of the franchise after the transfer
is approved. The most that can be urged is that it may impose conditions which will insure efficient operation in the public interest in
those matters which fall within the general field of its power. It
cannot make its consent dependent upon conditions which are unreasonable or which do not change the terms of the transfer of the
franchise, works or systems, or which encroach upon the right of the
relator to administer its corporate affairs according to its own judgment in matters in which the legislature has not given the Public
Service Commission any regulatory or supervisory powers."
In People ex rel. Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery RR. v.
Public Service Commission,'3 the' Court emphatically held that the
Commission could not, in considering an application for authority to
issue securities for refunding purposes, use as a standard for its approval "the actual value of the company's property and its earning ca12 264 N. Y. 17, 189 N. E. 764 (1934).
13 167 App. Div. 286, 153 N. Y. Supp. 344 (1st Dept. 1915).
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pacity" and could not compel it to reduce its book cost accordingly.
In confirming the action of the Commission in the Dry Dock case,
the Court of Appeals said:
"While, therefore, the Commission was wrong in applying the
test of the actual value of the company's property and its earning
capacity as a criterion for its approval of the issue of these new securities, it was right in refusing to approve their issue until the
relators had proven that the securities sought to be refunded represented actual investments for the company's capital account.
...11
Other cases where the courts held that the Commission has no
power to compel a company to write off book entries which would
alter the actual cost of its property are Matter of Lockport Light
Heat and Power v. Maltbie8 and People ex rel. Kings County Light8
ing Co. v. Straus."
During the period when these cases were being decided by the
courts, the court itself called attention to the fact that the amendment of the law was not a judicial function but appeal must be made
to the legislature. For instance, in Matter of Staten Island Edison
Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 7 the Court said:
"..

. The cases which have been cited need not be reviewed. We

consider them in harmony with the ruling which is here made, while
the statement of the purposes for the Public Service law and the Commission is here applied and followed. (People ex rel. D. & H. Co.
v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1; People ex rel. Binghamton L., H. & P. Co.
v. Stevens, 203 N. Y. 7; People ex rel. New York Edison Co. v.
Willcox, 207 N. Y. 86; People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co.,
138 App. Div. 601; aff'd, 199 N. Y. 539; People ex rel. Dry Dock,
etc., R.R. Co. v. Publ. Serv. Comm., 167 App. Div. 286)".
The Public Service Commission, during this whole period, attempted to obtain legislation designed to confer upon the Commission
the power which it had attempted to exercise by conditions attached
to its orders. Notable attempts were made in 1918, 1930, 1931, 1937.
All of these measures failed of enactment.' 8
14 Id. at 308, 309, 153 N. Y. Supp. at 357.
1r 257 App. Div. 11, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 595 (3d Dept. 1939).
36
178 App. Div. 840, 166 N. Y. Supp. 196 (1st Dept. 1917).
17 263 N. Y. 209, 218, 188 N. E. 713, 716 (1933).
18 Recommendation in Public Service Commission Ann. Rep. (2d Dist. 1918), in
9 N. Y. Legislative Documents XII (1919); SEN. INT. 1435, Pr. 1665, 2036; Ass. INT.
1811, Pr. 2065, 153rd Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1930); SEX. INT. 655, Pr. 685, 1355,
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Legislation designed to confer upon the Commission, the power
it attempted to exercise by the conditions attached to its orders, was
also introduced in 1937's and failed of passage just as had earlier
bills to the same effect.
In 1938, legislation looking toward the conferring upon the
Commission of such authority was introduced 2 and again did not
pass.
In 1939 the Commission recommended that
". the Commission should be empowered to require the companies

to maintain reserves in order that depreciation shall be currently
shown on their books as well as original cost, and a bill giving the

Commission adequate power in this direction should be enacted."'"
In each of these years and through 1949, with the exception
of 1942 and 1945, bills were introduced in the Legislature to confer
such power upon the Commission and each time they were rejected.22
IV.

THE ROCHESTER CASE: THE FIGHT AGAINST THE

UNIFORM ACCOUNTING ORDER AND THE THEORY
OF "ABORIGINAL" COST
WE now come to the most striking example of the use of the
irrelevant condition and the defiance by the Public Service Commission of the Legislature and of decisions of the courts, and the principles laid down in judicial decisions. This was the famous litigation
involving two separate cases: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
3
v. Maltbie
154th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1931); SEN. INT. 639, Pr. 683; Ass. INT. 1011, Pr. 1063,
160th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1937).
19 SEN. INT. 639, Pr. 683; Ass. INT. 1011, Pr. 1063, 160th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1937).
20 SEr. INT. 15, Pr. 15, 1436; Ass. INT. 15, Pr. 15, 161st Sess., N. Y. Legislature
(1938).
21 Public Service Commission, Ann. Rep. (1939), in 14 N. Y. Legislative Documents 42 (1940).
22 SEN. INT. 275, Pr. 280; Ass. INT. 427, Pr. 436, 162nd Sess., N. Y. Legislature
(1939); SEN. INT. 1150, Pr. 1332; Ass. INT. 1484, Pr. 1588, 163rd Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1940); Ass. INT. 271, Pr. 271, 164th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1941); SEN.
INT. 36, Pr. 36; Ass. INT. 76, Pr. 76, 166th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1943); Ass. INT.
970, Pr. 1036, 167th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1944); SEN. NT. 357, Pr. 357; Ass.
INT. 409, Pr. 409, 169th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1946); SENr. INT. 1566, Pr. 1713; Ass.
INT. 1763, Pr. 1868, 170th Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1947) ; Sm. INT. 305, Pr. 305, 171st
Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1948); SEr. INT. 366, Pr. 1055; SEN. INT. 1207, Pr. 1262;
Ass. INT. 1412, Pr. 1450, 172nd Sess., N. Y. Legislature (1949).
23 273 App. Div. 114, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (3d Dept. 1948), aff'd 298 N. Y. 867,
84 N. E. 2d 635 (1949), Financing Case; 273 App. Div. 202, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 771 (3rd
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This case was a direct outcome of an attempt by the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners to substitute an accounting method of
rate regulation for the methods theretofore used and to substitute a
new and entirely different theory for those which had been recognized
by the courts and the commissions as applicable in such rate making
up to that time.
At the time when Smyth v. Ames, 24 was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States there had been two main attempts to
devise a formula for rate making. One recognized, that the company which had had to raise money and provide facilities on a rising
market to meet the needs and demands of the service, owed a duty
to its stockholders and investors who provided the capital to see
that they got a fair return on that capital. If the company was to
maintain its service and keep up with the growth of demand, it would
have to make investments in a market of rising costs, even though the
revenue derived from the service would not provide sufficient return
to meet the expectations of those who put the venture capital into
the enterprise.
The prudent investment theory was a recognition that the investor was not only justly entitled to a fair return, but the customer
who expected the service would, in the long run, be benefited if the
company could command capital to finance improvements. An essential of such ability to finance was the recognition of the justice of a
fair return to the investor for the risk he took when he made his
investment.
On the other hand, the fair value theory of rate making recognized that the state could always obtain the title to the property by
condemnation and payment of its fair value. Therefore, the amount
which could be earned as a return on that sum (i.e., the payment of
its fair value) would be a measure of a fair return on the capital
risked in the enterprise.
These two theories were opposed to each other at times of extreme fluctuations in the level of prices. When Smyth v. Amesa 5
was decided, the level of prices was down and the railroad's rails
could have been replaced for less than they originally cost. Therefore,
Dept. 1946), app. den., 271 App. Div. 760, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 920 (3d Dept. 1946) Water
Rights Case.
24 169 U. S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 (1898), modified, 171 U. S. 361,
18 S. Ct. 888, 43 L. Ed. 197 (1898).
25 See note 24 supra.
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William Jennings Bryan and his associate counsel argued that the
railroads would only be entitled to earn what would be a moderate
return on the cost to reproduce their properties. At the time of the
inflation and great rise in the level of all costs in the first World War,
those who contended for lower rates were shouting for original cost,
diminished, nevertheless, by the deduction of any investment which by
hindsight proved to be unproductive over-building.
These were two well understood and recognized theories of rate
making. In the 1930's, a new and novel theory was devised and
forced upon the companies by Federal regulating authorities and by
State public utility commissions, especially in the inflationary period
of World War II.
This was the outcome of the perennial struggle of regulatory
commissions to devise a mechanical formula by which adjustments in
rates could be automatically made, either by increases or decreases
without destroying inducements to the investor sufficient to enable the
utilities companies to raise the capital necessary to keep up with the
demands of the consumers. All such formulas had failed because no
mechanical formula successfully anticipated changes in conditions
nor measured the demands on the service.
In many cases, the formula used did not measure the value of
the service to the public realistically. Neither the prudent investment
nor fair value method, took into account competitive services nor
changes in the value of the dollar as a medium of exchange. Neither
made any provision for the effects of competition either with the
service or in the financial market. Both were based on the assumption that public utilities were monopolies immune from competition.
A condition that the company must maintain its service regardless of the loss, would be the type of irrational or irrelevant condition that the courts would not enforce under ordinary conditions as
a matter of common justice.
Neither would the courts be favorable to the argument that,
although the title to one's property could not be taken for public
use without just compensation for its fair value, nevertheless, its use
could be so taken.
Some other justification for such an injustice must be found.
To meet this obstacle, an ancient fiction was resorted to. If
property was "dedicated to a public use", it could easily be assumed
that the owner was consenting to any limitation the public might put
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upon his own use. He was said to have contracted away his constitutional right to compensation on its fair value then or in the future.
This fiction could be made more appealing by coupling it with
the obvious fact that actual books well kept would give a true statement of costs, less speculative than an estimate (disregarding, of
course, loose bookkeeping methods and changes in the medium of exchange at different periods when dollars succeeded tobacco, or gold
coin of definite standard supplanted other currencies).
The new formula devised by public utility and railroad commissioners, through their organizations, was doubtless a further effort to
meet the desirable end of prompt adjustment of changes in rates to
changed costs by freezing one element, viz. the rate base on which
net return could be calculated. Undoubtedly many believed book
values were inflated and that lower rates to domestic consumers were
desirable from the public point of view. Certainly lower rates to the
domestic consumer would conform to the principles of democratic
price fixing and help to develop a mass market. At the same time,
we must not forget the fact that public utility commissioners are
human and that lower domestic rates appeal to the part of the public
that has the most votes.
There seemed to be a theory that stockholders were villains who
ought to be punished, ignoring the fact that if promoters, banks, investment bankers and bond and stock-salesmen had over-reached
some trusting innocents, as well as some gullible speculators, they had
disposed of their stocks which had long since passed into the hands
of investors and innocent purchasers for value.
In any event, a new formula to measure the rate base on which
the company was entitled to earn a fair return was devised as a substitute for the cost of reproduction and the prudent investment formulae. Thus capitalization could be revised, net earnings could be
reduced and rates also. By an accounting order, it was then sought
to compel the existing utility to substitute for its own costs, the cost
incurred by some predecessor at the time when the property
was first devoted to public use, and to write off all excesses into
suspense accounts to be amortized under direction of the commissions
and under their orders, from time to time. This was the theory of
aboriginal cost, so called because some well supplies were still being
used which had been acquired by the pioneers from the aborigines.
The prudent investment theory was speculative because the ac-
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tual costs of a company could be reduced by the hindsight of the
regulatory body which would substitute its idea of what was a prudent expenditure for that of the directors responsible for incurring
the costs at the time they actually were incurred. All excess over
what these regulatory bodies thought prudent, could be disallowed as
capital investment and no earnings on them permitted. Even more
speculative in many cases was the value obtained by estimating the
reproduction cost of the existing plant. In case after case engineering valuations contained absurdities. Instead of using modern ditching machines, the estimator assumed that all ditches would be dug
by hand. Instead of modem casting processes they assumed that obsolete methods used when the pipes were laid would still be used.
This theory was vehemently and cogently assailed as too speculative
by those who were interested in getting rates reduced.
On the other hand, the "vice of the aboriginal cost theory" was
that it ignored the actual costs incurred by the companies then being
regulated and substituted for them the costs incurred so long ago
that no accurate determination could be made of what actually was
incurred. How could a water company determine the cost of well
supplies bought from the Indians for powder, shot and rum? How
could that medium of exchange be translated into current dollars?
Consider the plight of a family who owned an extensive acreage
surrounding a woodland lake, which they used as a water supply for
themselves, relatives, friends and neighbors. They built a longer
main than was necessary for the riparian cottages, installed a pump
and extended the service to the families of their coachmen, butlers
and other retainers. When the jurisdiction of the New York Public
Service Commission was extended to cover water companies, they
were horrified to find that they were considered a public utility, bound
to serve all comers at rates based on the cost of the property at the
time it was first "devoted to public usel"
These costs were difficult to determine, since the bookkeeping
had been sketchy, most of them had been treated as operating expenses, some had been shared among some of those served, some had
not-all had been far lower than those current for pumps, pipe,
labor.
Fortunately, a court moved by a sense of justice disregarded
certain precedents to the contrary and held that the enterprise was not
a public utility (case unreported). It was then sold to a corporation
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which expanded the service and fixed its rates to cover its own costs
and profit. What it and its customers consider the fair value of the
services has not so far been challenged and the questions of: When
the "devotion to public service" occurred; what is the aboriginal cost;
how donated property should be treated; discrimination avoided by
eliminating free service to those who sold rights of way and other
easements for special considerations; and many other difficult problems have been ignored and left undetermined by the regulatory body.
Aboriginal cost is often just as speculative and unjust as a rate
base obtained through other formulas.
When the accounting order seeking to impose this new aboriginal
cost theory of ascertaining a rate base was issued by the New York
Public Service Commission, the validity of the order was attacked
in the courts of New York. It was held invalid and unconstitutional
by the Appellate Division and the case was carried to the Court of
Appeals for final decision and affirmed. The Appellate Division held
the order was beyond the power of the Commission to make and unconstitutional because it deprived the companies of their property
arbitrarily. Matter of New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 6 sometimes
referred to as the "Uniform Accounts Case."
In that instance, the Commission attempted to set up in a "suspense account" the difference between the cost of property to the
Company and its "Original Cost" (i.e., the cost of such property to
the person first devoting it to the public service), and provided that
such difference should "be written off over such period and in such
27
manner as the Commission may by order prescribe".
Also the Commission sought to impose generally on all companies theories of "straight-line" depreciation.
The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held each
and every one of these requirements invalid and unconstitutional.
In striking down these requirements, Presiding Justice Hill of
Division said :28
Appellate
the
"The power vested in the Commission to prescribe uniform methods
of keeping accounts and records (Pub. Serv. Law, Sec. 66, subd. 4)
does not include the power to compel a corporation to write off from
its book value a loss which it has not sustained, or to give up a part
26 244 App. Div. 685, 281 N. Y. Supp. 223 (3d Dept. 1935), aff'd 271 N. Y. 103,
2 N. E. 2d 277 (1936).
27 Id. at 688, 281 N. Y. Supp. 223, 226.
28 See note 26 supra at 688, 281 N. Y. Supp. at 226.
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of its constitutional rights. If as has been said 'the actual cost of the
property-the investment the owners have made-is a relevant fact'
(Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Comm., 289 U. S.
287, 306) a corporation cannot be compelled to make entries upon
its books calculated to conceal such relevant fact. It follows that the
Commission had no power to impose such condition. (People ex rel.
Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 264 N. Y. 17, 21).
The foregoing was written concerning a condition which the commission sought to impose as to the purchase of the property of one
utility corporation by another. If it lacks power as to one transaction it also lacks power to enforce by a general rule such a condition as to all similar transactions."
In spite of the decision in the Uniform System of Accounts case
and the many preceding cases disapproving and nullifying irrelevant
and objectionable conditions on constitutional grounds, the Public
Service Commission used the device to compel the companies to adopt
the system and establish this new method of rate making.
Whenever any company came before the Commission for approval of a security issue or a consolidation or some other project
which took on more of the character of a privilege than a right, the
Commission in approving the application, would attach a condition
that the company should accept the aboriginalcost accounting theory
and rewrite its books in accordance therewith.
The management in each case was confronted with the same
serious dilemma, as the daughter who asked her mother for leave to
go in swimming, and was told she could do so if she did not go near
the water.
They had three alternatives. They either had to (1) abandon
the proposed financing; (2) write off on their books a large portion of their capital investment; or (3) fight the invalid condition in
the courts at great expense and delay. The first and second alternatives might be fatal because during the delay, favorable financing
markets would be lost and the confidence of the investors in the safety of their investments shaken. On the other hand, to accept the
condition would result in definite loss to the existing security holders
of the Company by destroying the value of the equities underlying
their securities.
Many companies yielded to the pressure and accepted the conditions imposed upon them by the Commission.
The Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation adopted the third
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alternative and litigated the right of the Commission to attach such
conditions to its order.
Its controversy with the Public Utility Commission came before
the courts a number of different times. Sometimes only technical
matters of procedure were involved, but in two cases the Court of
Appeals passed upon the merits of issues involving principles of constitutional law and of equity and justice. These two were the "Water
Rights" case and the "Financing" case.
In the former case, the Commission in 1943 ordered the company to write off $3,832,171 which it had paid for water rights. The
Appellate Division annulled the Commission's order and denied leave
to appeal.2
About the same time the company applied to the Commission
for leave to issue bonds to fund bank loans and to pay for improvements to its plant, which it deemed essential to its service. This
0
was the "Financing" case3

The Commission approved of the financing by the bond issue
but only on condition that the company should adopt the devices
disapproved in the "Uniform Accounts" case, People ex rel. New
York Edison Company v. Maltbie.31
By these devices, the Company would have been compelled to
reduce its book costs by the difference between actual cost and
"aboriginal" cost, viz., $6,900,000 (including $3,832,171 paid for
water rights); and also to adopt the "straight line" method of depreciation.
Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals held these
conditions void and of no effect.
The astonishing thing is that, despite this victory, the procedure
used by the Public Utility Commission was effective with other companies. At the time when its orders were being made, the press was
full of criticisms of the Commission. The cases were discussed not
only in the financial columns of the New York daily papers but in
such technical journals as Telephony, Barron's National Business
and Financial Weekly, and the Public Utilities Fortnightly.
20 Matter of Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Maltbie, 271 App. Div. 202, 63
N. Y. S. 2d 771 (3d Dept. 1946), app. denied, 271 App. Div. 760 64 N. Y. S. 2d 920
(3d Dept. 1946).
30 Matter of Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Maltbie, 273 App. Div. 114, 76
N. Y. S. 2d 671 (3d Dept. 1948), aff'd 298 N. Y. 867, 84 N. E. 2d 635 (1949).
31 See note 26 supra.
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Finally, Benjamin in his monumental report to the Governor of
New York on Administrative Adjudication in New York,8 2 discusses
the reasons why companies in case after case had bowed to the demands of the Commission in security cases because they were forced
to by the need of funds and the necessity of "meeting a market."
Public Utilities Fortnightly said with reference to the attitude
taken by the New York Public Service Commission in finance cases:
"The issue (over the compulsory increase of the depreciation reserve
(which has the same effect as a write-off) and the making of arbitrary
write-offs of certain kinds of property) has arisen principally in the
State of New York where the public service commission (though not
'led' by the F. P. C.) has been following a particularly strong policy.
The commission has long wrangled with leading utilities in the state
(Consolidated Edison Company, Niagara Hudson Power Corporation,
New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, and others) over valuation and accounting questions. It has followed . . . policy of withholding or delaying approval of mergers, refinancing, etc., until concessions could be wrung from utilities with regard to plant accounting
adjustments.
"A more immediate issue has been the Rochester Gas & Electric
Corporation request for approval of a financing program both for
refunding and new money purposes. As the price of approval the
Commission proposed (among other adjustments) that $6,658,171
'questioned' items be written out of earned surplus and that some
$10,700,000 should be added to depreciation reserve ....
The most
important issue arises over the questions of writing out of plant account an item of $3,832,171 for water rights. The Commission in
1943 (Case 9552) had ordered this write-off but the Appellate Division (a state court) a year ago annulled the commission's order
and denied permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals.""8
(Here the writer quoted from the opinion in the above referred to
case involving the cost of water rights recorded on its books, and
continued:)
"The company therefore, feels that this amount can properly remain
on the books.
"The point to be emphasized in connection with the water rights case
is that it goes beyond the theory of original cost and even of prudent
32 Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York, 2 Supplementary Reports on the Dept. of Public Service, 104, 105 (1942).
33 PuBLic UTaS
FORTNIGHTLY, July 17, 1947, 109, 110.
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investment. The item in question was fully paid for by a utility
company and has not been proved to be a bad investment."34 (Italics
supplied.)
The New York Times, commenting on the concern of the utility
industry in this State over financing problems, stated:
"Public utility security analysts have been finding it difficult to
interest some large investment trusts in the securities of New
York utilities because, it was said, of the 'vindictive' attitude on the
part of the State commission.35 Such alleged punitive action by the
P. S. C. it was asserted, was detrimental to the earning power of State
utilities."
In referring to the rejection by the Commission of a plan of recapitalization and sale of Staten Island Edison Corporation, the writer
remarked:
".. . it (the Commission) stated its objection to the 'general attitude

of GPU and the corporations represented by counsel'. It also expressed resentment at resorts to the courts by GPU. Rochester Gas
& Electric and Staten Island Edison for relief from commission rulings considered onerous or illegal."
"Rochester Gas had challenged the right of the Commission to make
approval of a perfectly legal and orthodox financing operation contingent upon accepting an accounting method which the Commission
otherwise had no power to impose. It went to the courts and was
upheld, and apparently the judicial rebuff to the Commission
rankled." 36
Telephony in July 31, 1948, said in connection with the decision
of the Appellate Division appeal in the Rochester Gas and Electric
Case:
"But it was a costly victory for the company. Market conditions
have so changed that it now stands to lose millions of dollars in
price advantage for its securities, as compared with what it would
have received had the original petition for commission approval been
promptly granted as it should have been. That is a pretty expensive
brand of regulation. The commission is taught a lesson but the utility
company has to pay for it.""7
In its brief before the Court of Appeals the counsel for the
Rochester Company discussed the disadvantages the company had
34 Id. at 110.
35 Editorial Page, N. Y. Times, May 9, 1948.

36 See note 35 supra.
37 TELEPHONY, July 31, 1948, at 24.
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suffered during the lengthy litigation over the illegal order of the
Public Utility Commission. Among other things they stated:
".. . bankers advanced the Company, while the case was pending,
on short-term unsecured obligations, more than $12,500,000, at favorable interest rates. And the preferred stockholders of the Company
expressly consented to the Company's exceeding its short-term borrowing capacity as established in its charter. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission authorized the extension of the Company's short-term borrowing capacity to permit such borrowing."38
Unless the corporation had been well established and possessed
of great resources and unusual credit, it could never have afforded to
make the fight even if it could have met the legal expenses.
Even after the decision of the Court of Appeals the Public Service Commission in its order entered in 1949 attempted to evade the
decision of the Court and special proceedings had to be taken to
force it to make the order conform to the decision of the highest
court in the state. It was not until 1949 that the Company was able
to get its books of account established in such a way that it could
accomplish its future financing, and, only then, by a compromise
on the period during which amortization of certain items in their
capital accounts was to be accomplished.
No other company duplicated this fight of the Rochester Co.
The utilities acquiesced because in addition to the disadvantage and
cost of fighting orders of the Commission, there were advantages to
be gained by complying with its requirements. Apparently no company could afford to incur its displeasure. The favorable interest
rates which then prevailed enabled many companies to reduce their
costs by reducing their overheads. Consolidations which were approved by the Commission enabled costs to be further reduced and
greater revenues to be obtained through widening markets. Later,
approvals had to be obtained for various matters important to the
service, for example: change from artificial gas to natural gas required six different orders from the Commission approving, among
other things, changes in the unit used in measurement of the unit
on which rates were based, financings, new rate schedules, accounting entries-and many other matters. This change to natural gas
alone enabled many companies to meet competition with other fuels,
38 Brief for petitioner-respondents, p. 30, Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Maltbie, 298 N. Y. 867, 84 N. E. 2d 635 (1949).
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avoiding the fate which befell the street railroads. It must also not
be forgotten that large issues of securities in the period from 1940
on, and their distribution on a seller's market brought profits to promoters, underwriters and others. All of these advantages outweighed
the disadvantages of the delay and expenses of litigation and turned
people who would otherwise have been fighters into "appeasers", in
contrast to the pioneers addressed by Henry Clay a hundred years
before. Certainly freedom of contract as well as other liberties in
dealing with property were impaired by the encroachment of regulation and regimentation just as that statesman foresaw would always
be the consequence of appeasement.
It was not because the Spirit of '76 is dead in this country
but because managements felt more was to be gained by negotiation
than by litigation. After all, the War of 1812 was pretty indecisive
and in most wars many years of cold war succeed the fighting and
long years have to elapse before diplomatic negotiation can achieve
all the desired ends for which the wars were fought.
V. CONCLUSION
I CAN think of no better way to bring out the full significance
of the foregoing study, than to quote the conclusions of Dean Pound
and Justice Jackson in their authoritative articles on administration
procedure.
Dean Pound in his article on judicial process in action says:
"Administrative as contrasted with judicial application of law is
characteristically a matter of discretion. Cases are assumed to be
unique and are sought to be decided solely on the particular circumstances of the particular case. This theory of application, which
is appropriate to the application of standards, tends to be carried
out in the whole field of administrative activity. In the absence of the checks which make tolerable the relatively small
margin now allowed for judicial discretion, the wide scope for
personal judgment of administrative officials which has come to
be allowed in recent years raises serious as well as difficult problems."3 9 (Italics supplied.)
In his posthumously published Godkin lecture (which was never
delivered), Justice Jackson, speaking of Administrative tribunals,
says: "They constitute a headless (fourth branch) of the Govern39 Pound, Judicial Process in Action, 1 N. Y. L. F. 31 (1955).
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ment, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers." 40
The lawyer practicing before these administrative tribunals must
share the misgivings of these great masters of jurisprudence. Nevertheless, although he approaches the problems pragmatically rather
than philosophically, he must have observed that many of these new
tribunals as they mature, gain a feeling of responsibility and in the
realization that the practical solution of the problems cannot be
reached merely by seeking what is expedient, but by finding and applying principles of justice, equity and fair dealing. It is the high
duty of the profession to assist in that great task so that the rights of
individuals and the interests of society can be adjusted and recognized.
To quote further from Justice Jackson's fine treatise:
the administrative tribunals clearly are here to stay and proba,..
bly to increase in number and powers. The values affected by their
decisions probably exceed every year many times the dollar value of
all money judgments rendered by the federal courts. They also affect
vital rights of the citizen. There have been instances of excessive
zeal and abuse of power. The same may be said of the judiciary. My
own belief is that every safeguard should be thrown about the process
of administrative adjudication so that its fact-finding will be honest,
unprejudiced, neutral, and competent. It should be isolated from
the prosecuting function. As a prosecutor, the body serves a constituency and promotes an interest. As a judge, it should know no
constituent and serve no interest except justice. But in time we shall
see these defects in the administrative process corrected, and the
process will help supply the shortcomings we have found in the three
original branches."'"
It is fitting to ponder these profound observations, expressed
with such lucidity and tremendous authority.
40 JACKSON, THE SUPREME

52 (1955).
41 Id. at 51.
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